INTRODUCTION C H I N A-A F R I C A R E S E A R C H I N I T I AT I V E

SAIS-CARI WORKING PAPER | NO. 17 | AUGUST 2018
small geese travelling together in flocks. The four kinds of firms each offer different kinds of development opportunities and challenges.
CHINESE FIRMS AND AFRICAN MANUFACTURING: WHAT DO WE KNOW?
WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT CHINESE MANUFACTURING investment in Africa?
Some analysts and observers have argued that China's main role in African industry is likely to be through import competition. For example, in a 2008 paper, Kaplinsky stated that Chinese firms could start to set up factories in Africa, but "[so] far there is no evidence of this occurring." 5 In fact, researchers have pointed to a long history of Chinese engagement in African manufacturing, through foreign aid projects but also direct investment. 6 These investments go back as far as the 1960s, when several Shanghai and Hong Kong business families invested in Nigeria shortly after independence, later coming to dominate production of enamelware, plastic sandals, and building materials. 7 In the early 1990s the Shanghai Textile Industry Bureau set up a company in Mauritius, Hong Kong-Shanghai Textile Ltd., to export to the European Union and in so doing avoiding quotas that had been imposed on goods coming from China.
Elsewhere, by 1999 the market for black and white televisions in South Africa was dominated by products assembled locally by a Chinese firm, Shanghai Guangdian
Company. 8 According to UNCTAD, which based its data on China's Ministry of Commerce, between 1979 and 2000, Chinese firms had already established 230 manufacturing investments in Africa. 9 South Africa received the highest share (83), but the data suggests that there was already a significant Chinese factory presence in Nigeria (33) , Kenya (21) , Mauritius (20) , Ghana (17) , and Zambia (17) . with a US$6 million investment; large Chinese tanneries opened in Uganda and Ethiopia. 10 By 2005, 45 percent of Chinese firms with overseas investment plans, surveyed for a World Bank study, said that they were planning to invest in African manufacturing.
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A small number of field studies of Chinese investment in Africa have also identified Chinese manufacturing firms. For example, a 2012 survey of Chinese companies operating in the construction, manufacturing, and service sectors in Ethiopia found 45 manufacturing enterprises out of a total of 69 firms. 12 However, a similar study of 42
Chinese enterprises in Uganda's capital Kampala identified only 7 manufacturing firms. 13 Likewise, a 2014 survey of 75 Chinese firms in Kenya included only 5 manufacturing firms. 14 Although Africa is clearly receiving investment from Chinese industrialists, it is difficult to obtain data on the value and scope of their manufacturing investment. MOFCOM data using United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) classifications suggested that 33 percent of MOFCOM registered companies investing in Africa expressed interest in manufacturing activities. 17 On the other hand, a study by Chen, Tang, and Dollar using the same data coded only 20 percent as manufacturing. 18 Yet a World Bank study of six African countries found that according to data provided by African investment approval agencies, 44 percent of all proposed Chinese investment projects were intended to be in manufacturing. 19 These differences show the danger of using existing data as anything more than a preliminary and suggestive tool.
As we show below, we found none of the databases were accurate in identifying
Chinese firms that had actually made manufacturing investments in Africa. 25 As Figure 2 shows, they reached a peak of 162 in 2013, with over a thousand proposals having been registered between 2000 and 2015. 26 Although not all of these firms will ultimately build factories, the timing of this heightened interest in exploring Africa as an industrial base likely reflects push factors (predominantly cost).
From this database, we selected the four low-and lower middle-income sub-Saharan African countries with the largest number of manufacturing investment registrations for further investigation: Ethiopia, Ghana, Nigeria, and Tanzania. In 2014 and 2015, we conducted field-scoping studies to identify and then visit Chinese manufacturers in those countries. 27 In Ghana and Tanzania we tried to visit or at least confirm the presence of all Chinese manufacturers in the country. In Ethiopia, we only interviewed firms in the leather and textile sectors located in and around the capital, Addis
Ababa, while security concerns in Nigeria limited our field visits to the area around 
Number of Projects Year
Lagos and the Calabar industrial zone, both in the south of the country. 28 In all four countries, we identified the sector and products being produced, the ownership structure, age of the firm, and its patterns of employment. Table 2 provides summary statistics on the firms interviewed.
Identifying a universe of Chinese manufacturing firms in these four countries was not straightforward. Researchers used the MOFCOM OFDI registration database and were also able to obtain lists of Chinese investments that were registered with local investment authorities in all four countries. As with a similar World Bank study, we found a surprising degree of divergence between the MOFCOM registration data and that collected by the local authorities. 29 Table 3 summarizes the differences between the various lists, per country, and shows how few manufacturing investments we were able to confirm from the Chinese and the host country lists. (a) Some firms could not be identified as SOE or private.
(b) The number of firms include all ethnically Chinese firms that have operating factories or factories in the final stages of construction. The number of investment projects is greater than the number of firms because some companies have more than one registered investment.
(c) We were unable to obtain investment values from all firms. For Ethiopia, we have data from 7 firms, 12 from Ghana, 9 from Nigeria, and 13 from Tanzania. and 2016, we met with 18 Chinese manufacturers in the leather and textile/garment sectors. Furthermore, we confirmed the active presence of Chinese firms producing building materials such as cement, plate glass, gypsum board, and recycled steel in addition to other products like air filters, wigs, and automobile assembly. We interviewed a handful of these firms. Finally, we interviewed several non-Chinese firms that had relocated operations from China to Ethiopia; all of which had Chinese trainers and technical experts on staff.
GHANA
IN THE 1960s AND 1970s, CHINA'S AID PROGRAM assisted Ghana in building the
Juapong Textile Mill and a pencil factory in Kumasi; although both survived for decades, neither remains in operation. 34 In contrast to the aid program, Chinese equity investment in Ghana's manufacturing sector does not have a long history. With the exception of several companies from Taiwan and Hong Kong, the oldest Chinese manufacturing factories that are still in operation were set up in the early 2000s.
We interviewed 33 Chinese firms with active investments in Ghana. In the three areas of Ghana where we conducted fieldwork (Accra, Kumasi, and Tema), we found a significant cluster of Chinese firms in the plastics industry. We also learned that over a dozen Chinese businessmen had been assembling suitcases and making furniture, but most of them exited these sectors when the costs of imported raw materials rose due to the depreciation of the country's currency during an economic crisis that began in to Tanzania, some later setting up factories. 35 We interviewed the managers or owners of 20 Chinese companies that have invested in 27 projects and confirmed the presence of an additional five projects.
Chinese factories in Tanzania were found in several entry-stage manufacturing sectors, including textiles and apparel; plastics (shoes, utensils, plastic recycling, and bag production); construction materials (steel, glass, gypsum, and aluminum tiles);
* Table 4 provides an overview of the main sector divisions and products produced by these firms.
RUBBER AND PLASTIC PRODUCTS (DIVISION 22)
AT LEAST 26 CHINESE FIRMS INTERVIEWED for our study were producing plastics, making this the largest sector. Chinese plastics manufacturing involved three activities that are coded separately by the ISIC. A large number of the firms we interviewed were recycling plastics, sorting into various materials, and producing pellets, powders, or doing other kinds of minimal processing. Other entrepreneurs were moving up the value chain, producing new plastic products (plastic bags, buckets, chairs, etc.) from recycled materials. Among this group was a subset producing plastic footwear, which is coded by the ISIC under "leather and related products." We discuss all of the plastic products in this sector, including footwear.
Plastic waste recycling may now be a sunset industry in China, creating an opportunity for recycling firms to seek business elsewhere. We found plastic waste recyclers made up a significant part of small and medium-scale investors in Tanzania and especially Ghana, where a coordinator of the Ghana Plastic Manufacturing
Association estimated that there were about 20 Chinese plastic recycling firms operating in the country. Although we did not interview any Chinese plastics firms in Ethiopia, there is some evidence of Chinese investment in these sectors. 36 Some
Chinese recycling firms produce ethylene vinyl acetate (EVA) pellets while others ground recycled plastics into a powder that provides the raw material for plastic footwear, construction materials, chemicals, and medical supplies. While some sold these materials locally, others exported them back to China for further processing using technologies not yet available in these countries. Furthermore, in February 2013,
SCOPE OF INVESTMENT
the Chinese government launched "Operation Green Fence", restricting the import of containers filled with some kinds of recycling waste. 37 This could create additional opportunities for processing of these restricted recycling wastes in Africa, although the costs and benefits would need to be carefully evaluated.
We found it interesting that a number of Chinese firms were producing plastic products and appeared to be competing successfully with Asian imports. Nigeria had several Chinese-owned plastics factories, including Shifa Plastics and Mark Sino (plastic construction materials). But Tanzania and Ghana appeared to have the most.
Firms in these countries were following in the footsteps of Indian and Lebanese investors who had first invested in these sectors in the 1950s and now dominate the larger-scale plastics industry. In Tanzania, several Chinese firms began by producing simple molded plastic sandals from imported raw materials and expanded into plastic utensils and bags. Some companies, like Verise Industry, had closed their plastic footwear factories in China and moved them to Africa.
Although the plastics industry was most well represented in Tanzania and Ghana the scale of production in each country was markedly different. In Tanzania, investments ranged from US$1.5 to US$15 million, and local employment from 100 to 500 per factory, with the Chinese backed plastics sector employing an estimated 5,000 Tanzanians. Meanwhile, in Ghana, investments ranged from only US$150,000 to US$450,000
with local employment ranging from 10 to 90 employees per factory. Other companies were producing metal products out of steel and aluminum, while gypsum board seemed to be a popular product for Chinese factories in Tanzania with at least one in Ethiopia as well. Several Chinese factories imported aluminum ingots to produce window frames and other building materials, using Chinese molds.
METAL AND MINERAL PRODUCTS (DIVISIONS
Only one Chinese factory produced glass, although another imported ordinary glass and treated it to produce tempered and other specialized glass (including bullet-proof glass).
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Although cement is a significant sector for Chinese investment in several other African countries, including Zambia, we were only able to identify Chinese cement investments in two of the four countries: Ethiopia and Tanzania. 38 Several other major
Chinese building material investments were under discussion or in early stages of construction but had not yet been launched at the time of our field research. These included a proposed plant in Ghana to produce rebar, wire rods, and welded pipe and a US$1.3 billion iron ore-coal-steel joint venture between Tanzania's state-owned National Development Corporation and Hongda, a private Sichuan firm, in the south of the country. But given the overcapacity of China's own steel industry and related price cuts, it seems unlikely that smelting iron ore and producing new steel in Africa will prove competitive any time soon.
TEXTILES AND APPAREL (DIVISIONS 13-14)
A GROWING NUMBER OF CHINESE FIRMS ARE INVOLVED in textile processing Of the four, Ethiopia was the only country where we found significant investment in the leather sector. Xinghua, a cotton processing and agricultural trading company from Hubei province, opened an abattoir and tannery complex in Shinyanga, Tanzania.
The company originally thought of investing in the cotton sector in Tanzania but decided after a visit in 2010 that the meat and hides value chain looked more promising.
PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS: WHICH GEESE?
WHILE THERE IS SOME OVERLAP AMONG INVESTMENT projects and investors, we find that Chinese manufacturing ventures tend to fall into one of four categories of "geese": (1) geese seeking raw materials; (2) large, global supply chain geese; (3) strategic, market-seeking geese; (4) small geese traveling together.
* Table 5 measures number of total firms, not number of total investments.
Ethiopia Ghana Nigeria Tanzania
Raw materials-seeking geese 
ANALYSIS
GEESE SEEKING RAW MATERIALS
DESPITE THE BELIEF THAT CHINESE INVESTMENT in Africa is primarily
resource-seeking, in these four countries we found only a few examples of manufacturing companies seeking raw materials to process and then export. Several firms in our four country scoping studies were active in the agribusiness sector, adding value to local agricultural raw materials that were then exported, such as sisal processing and honey cultivation in Tanzania. But the most significant group of raw material-seeking investment was found in the cluster of Chinese firms tanning, finishing, and ultimately manufacturing leather in Ethiopia.
Most of Africa's raw minerals (including petroleum) are exported, without any refining or smelting, to higher income countries where capital and energy-intensive processing takes place. 41 Here, in countries outside of our sample, Chinese firms have made some inroads. In Zambia, a Chinese company in Chambishi is smelting copper ore into blister copper and ingots although plans to set up a copper semi-fabricates plant remain on hold. 42 Although several Chinese firms have expressed interest in developing massive iron ore and steel complexes in Africa, none of these projects have materialized. To be sure, the production of steel from iron ore is not widespread in Africa, where most steel is either imported or produced from scrap. Although Nigeria and Zimbabwe have steel mills that process iron ore, South Africa is the only Sub-Saharan African country whose production is significant enough to be included among the 66 steel producers that make up 99 percent of global output.
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LARGE, GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAIN GEESE
THE "FLYING GEESE" MODEL DESCRIBES THE MIGRATION of global production from higher to lower cost countries, with labor-intensive activities being the first to relocate. Here we found a small but significant sample of Chinese firms that have relocated such labor-intensive activities as garment and shoe production to Tanzania and Ethiopia. Although we saw no examples of this kind of "flying geese" in Nigeria or
Ghana, other scoping studies outside our countries of focus identified a large-scale Chinese garment manufacturer in Madagascar (King Deer) and a Chinese company, Tianli, whose cotton contract farming operations in Madagascar supply its export-oriented cotton spinning mill in Mauritius. 44 Because of its labor-intensive nature, garment production for export is normally one of the earliest activities to offshore when labor costs begin to rise during structural transformation. Thus, garment producers are the first "flying geese" to migrate abroad.
JDU (owner of Tanzanian subsidiary, Tooku) produced mainly in China and in Cambodia prior to Tooku's founding in 2012. Their website notes that Tanzania was chosen for its lower labor costs and its access to the US market through the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA into the EU under the "Everything But Arms" arrangement (EBA). As production costs increased in China, George Shoes, whose owner is from Taiwan but with operations in China, also opened a new production base in Addis Ababa in 2014. All three factories export to the US through international shoe agents such as Solano and Brown Shoes.
Brown Shoes was particularly influential in helping to pull these firms to Ethiopia. 47 As with King Deer in Madagascar, these three large factories are located in industrial zones that bear some resemblance to export processing zones in the first waves of "flying geese".
STRATEGIC, LOCAL MARKET-SEEKING GEESE
WE FOUND AN IMPORTANT CATEGORY OF CHINESE manufacturing in which entrepreneurs are designating capital for substantial import substitution investments targeting local markets. The firms in this category were nearly all privately owned.
Many had previously been involved in trade, usually, but not always, exporting a
Chinese product that they eventually began producing in Africa. Others came up with product ideas through market studies and consumer surveys. founded Viju Milk, a Chinese firm that is among Nigeria's most prominent bottled drink producers. 49 He decided to test the Nigerian market by importing yogurt and milk beverages, products that soon became popular with Nigerian children and youth.
As of 2014, his firm was said to employ nearly 2,000 Nigerian workers. Similar in size, Hongda Steel in Nigeria employs some 3,500 Nigerians in its recycled steel factor while Rebecca Wig, manufacturing artificial hairpieces in Ghana, has around 900 local employees.
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OPPORTUNISTIC SMALL GEESE, TRAVELING TOGETHER
OUR FINAL CATEGORY WE CALL "small geese, traveling together." These manufacturers usually remain small-scale, cluster together in the same sector or industrial zone, and are often related to each other or have similar regional origins.
In Tanzania were simply burning plastic waste and saw an opportunity. In 2007, he opened the first plastic recycling operation, linking it to an injection-molding factory. As recycled plastic is in high demand as a raw material in China, it is relatively expensive to import into Ghana, so Chen was easily able to compete with imports. A few years later, he opened a plastics factory in Benin and two in Nigeria (Lagos and Abuja), with a third planned for northern Nigeria.
NOT CHINESE, BUT FLYING GEESE?
BRAUTIGAM DOCUMENTED HOW NIGERIAN TRADERS learned about manufacturing processes through site visits to Asian factories, later using their contacts and knowledge to become industrialists themselves. 51 During the course of this research, we found several African firms in Nigeria that had followed such a pattern, contracting with Chinese experts to transfer technology and build skills in their own factories. In the town of Nnewi, for example, four Nigerian manufacturing firms employed Chinese experts at the time of our field study, with a total of 58 Chinese and 8,297 Nigerian workers. Other firms had also previously employed Chinese experts for temporary training purposes. Some Nigerian firms had also sent staff to China for training when opening new product lines and in one case, six staff members were even sent to learn Mandarin. 52 We also identified several non-Chinese firms in the leather gloves, shoes, and garment sectors in Ethiopia and Tanzania 
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR AFRICA
BELOW, WE SUMMARIZE a set of challenges and opportunities that we see arising from Chinese manufacturing investment in Africa.
A. IMPORT SUBSTITUTION
ONE OF THE PERHAPS SURPRISING FINDINGS of our study was that of all the firms interviewed, 48% (42) were producing solely for the host country market with an additional 10 firms also exporting only within the region. In most, but not all, of these cases the companies manufactured products that substituted for imported goods.
There are likely to be some tariff protections for these products. In plastic products, for example, the Chinese firms were responding to the slight advantage provided by protections, ranging from a 20% duty in Ghana to 25% in Tanzania and 35% in Ethiopia. 54 Yet these are not particularly high protections. This suggests that local African firms are not taking advantage of the local market potential in many of these countries.
B. ADDING VALUE TO RAW MATERIALS AND LOCAL INPUTS
SOME CHINESE FIRMS WERE ADDING VALUE to raw materials through processing. In some cases they went on to export most or all of the products. We found this pattern among the tanneries in Ethiopia, a Chinese-owned sisal farm in Tanzania, and several textile factories that use local cotton as inputs. If we count scrap steel and waste plastic as "raw materials" we can also include the steel mills and plastic product factories as WHAT KINDS OF CHINESE "GEESE" ARE FLYING TO AFRICA?
"adding value." None of these firms were using particularly complex technologies. The sisal farm's machinery dated back to the colonial era, for example. Particularly in Ghana's plastics industry, local firms have entered these sectors after learning the ropes from working for or supplying Chinese firms (who in some cases also sold them the machinery). Other foreign firms have also invested in these sectors. In Ghana, for example, Indian firms dominate the production of recycled steel. Yet it is likely that other niche opportunities exist for Ghanaian entrepreneurs to exploit. We see some trace evidence of this beginning to occur in the plastics sector.
C. POWER AND TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE
ALTHOUGH THE CELL-PHONE REVOLUTION has improved communications immensely, power and transport continue to be challenges for many firms in Africa.
The difficulties of power and transport logistics will continue to hamper relocation decisions by Chinese firms, not to mention raise costs for African entrepreneurs thinking about investing in factories.
Some Chinese firms have grown large enough to arrange for their own power grids. "To ensure smooth production and maximize the life of our machines," the head of Viju Milk noted in Nigeria, "we have set up our own power grid with a local gas company to ensure stable power supply … If transport, including road and rail, was in place, costs would fall greatly, and efficiency would improve. We expect to use rail in the next few years." 55 Yet poor infrastructure outside Nigeria stymied Viju Milk's plans to expand into Ghana, Burkina Faso, and Togo. To attract more foreign investment and to encourage domestic investors, these infrastructure challenges need to be overcome. When we did market research in 2010, 12 millimeter steel rod was sold at US$1,100 per ton in the market, but last year the price dropped to US$760.
D. INDUSTRIAL ZONES
And we estimate the price will come down to US$690 per ton by the end of the year … So the only way we can ensure our operation in this country is to sustain our quality and increase the productivity.
In Ghana, several firms still listed on official lists as "Chinese manufacturers" in the country had exited the market when their input prices rose sharply during a period of economic instability.
F. LABOR RELATIONS AND SAFETY
SOME CHINESE FIRMS ENCOUNTERED SAFETY PROBLEMS and were non-compliant
with local regulations, which in turn led to protests and strikes. For example, in Tanzania, Tooku experienced labor protests in 2014 and a labor strike in late 2015, which might have dissuaded them from further investment. We heard some feedback pertaining to local xenophobia toward Chinese. An industrialist in Nigeria told us that his company had experienced anti-Chinese sentiment: "The governments involved need to work on getting locals to be more welcoming. When I first came, locals on the street would shout, 'Go back to China,' when I drove down the road."
Local workers had their own complaints about safety and Chinese non-compliance with regulations created to provide protections for permanent workers. Hongxing
Steel in Nigeria was closed several times for safety and other violations, and was even castigated as a "slave-driver" on Nigerian social media.
G. ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES
WE FOUND EVIDENCE THAT SOME CHINESE FIRMS have brought technologies that produce more pollutants to Africa. This is not to be unexpected, as tighter environmental regulations are often a push factor for firm relocation, and China's environmental restrictions are in general being enforced more vigorously. For example, Baoyao Steel in Nigeria bought and imported the physical assets of an old steel plant in Shanghai that had been shut down by the Chinese government due to tighter environmental 
I. TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND SKILL DIFFUSION
WE EXPLORED THE HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL LINKAGES between Chinese firms
and African firms, workers, and institutions, and will be reporting our observations in a companion paper. We observed that employment in Chinese factories is significant, with some 20,000 jobs generated by the companies interviewed. This translates into considerable diffusion of skills learned on the job, and the introduction of factory culture as a source of employment for young people, many of whom had likely never worked in factories before. However, we can summarize other potential areas of impact of Chinese manufacturing investment as, so far, fairly limited in terms of technology transferred and skills diffused to African firms.
There are many reasons for the relatively limited linkages of Chinese factories.
One is the relatively short time these firms have been in operation in most countries. A second is that firms are, in general, not forming geographic clusters in a sub-sector. We found only three significant clusters-plastics in Ghana and Tanzania, and leather in Ethiopia (although textiles may be emerging as a cluster in that country as well).
Meanwhile, in Nigeria, we identified considerable technology transfer and training occurring through the market, with African firms contracting with Chinese suppliers to install machinery and train their workers. We also found that although
Chinese firms do not yet show many signs of working directly with local suppliers to improve quality, their demand for higher quality inputs have in some cases led to technology upgrades by local firms. This form of learning may prove to be a more enduring phenomenon than inter-firm transfer in a competitive environment.
AS WE NOTED AT THE START OF THIS PAPER, manufacturing is difficult for Chinese firms in these four countries. We encountered many tales of entrepreneurs opening factories in one business and then having to close their doors. The reasons for this varied. In the plastics industry in Tanzania, competition from other Chinese investors became intense and in one case, a plastic shoe firm closed its doors after its lease had risen by 300 to 400 percent. Although this entrepreneur was able to purchase his own land, production has yet to resume. A businessman from Taiwan opened a shoe factory in Ghana in 2004, using imported raw materials (artificial leather). At its peak, he employed about 200 Ghanaians. A decade later, due to cheaper competition from imports, employment had fallen to only 30 with a similar shrinkage in both production output and profit.
In Ethiopia, Ghana, Nigeria, and Tanzania Chinese manufacturing firms have a significant and growing presence. Chinese manufacturing investors seem to be mainly located in the fabled "missing middle" -neither small, nor large. Yet so far, the firms in our study seem to primarily be replicating the experience of earlier foreign investors (Indian, Lebanese, and even earlier generations of Chinese from Hong Kong). Most are targeting local markets, substituting for imports, and hoping that reduced transportation costs and local knowledge will allow them a higher profit margin. A small but significant group could, perhaps, be seen as the vanguard of the flying geese -relocating to Africa to take advantage of lower costs and integrating African producers into global value chains. But so far, these firms are few and far between.
Some might argue that firms substituting for imports are not going to be able to reap the economies of scale and productivity improvements that global production
allows. Yet we would note that African countries are presently importing some US$100 billion in goods and services from China. Many of the Chinese firms in our study see capturing some of that market as feasible, even without the generous protections of an earlier era of import substitution.
We expect Chinese investment in manufacturing to grow. At the December 2015
Forum on China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in Johannesburg, South Africa, the Chinese government officially committed to assisting in African industrialization. 56 In general, despite the challenges outlined above, Chinese firms were optimistic about the opportunities for production in Africa. To close with an optimistic example of what could be the future of Chinese manufacturing in Africa we can look to HSJQ. HSJQ has invested heavily in Ghana for its two paper mills. Back in China, the company was operating steel plants, cement factories, wood processing plants, and other business.
With rising production costs, overcapacity, and a saturated market in China, HSJQ told us that they plan to close these factories down in the next few years and relocate them to Africa as they have already done with their paper mills. ★
WHAT KINDS OF CHINESE "GEESE" ARE FLYING TO AFRICA?
CONCLUSION
CODING METHODS
The definitions and standards we use for coding in this paper are based on the international standard of industrial classification adopted by the UN (International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities, Rev.4, or ISIC Division) with a few modifications. According to ISIC, manufacturing refers to "the physical or chemical transformation of materials, substances, or components into new products," including "substantial alteration, renovation or reconstruction of goods". Therefore, production, processing, assembly of manufactured products, smelting and refining are considered manufacturing. Ready-mixed concrete production, leather tanning and operation of slaughterhouses are also considered manufacturing. However, we depart from the ISIC classifications in these specific activities.
• ISIC considers" maintenance and repair of industrial and commercial machinery and equipment" (Division 33) to be manufacturing, but we do not include these activities as such.
• ISIC does not classify the production of plastic pellets and other raw material from recycled plastics to be manufacturing, but we do include this as manufacturing.
• ISIC considers some agricultural processing activities to be manufacturing (such as rice milling, Division 10) but does not consider cotton ginning or sisal processing to be manufacturing. We classify all post-harvest, mechanized, value-addition agricultural processing as manufacturing.
To elaborate we continue with the following examples. Shandong Jichai New Energy Tech Co. Ltd. registered with MOFCOM for opening a subsidiary in Algeria in 2004, and the business scope of the subsidiary includes production and assembling of gas and oil power generation equipment, import of parts and components, maintenance of power plant and after-sale service, etc. This is categorized in our data as manufacturing (at least in intention) as it includes production and assembling of equipment. Xiangtan Shenzhoulong Industry Co. Ltd. established a steel company in Algeria, and its business scope is described as steel smelting and sale of steel products, which is also considered as manufacturing as it involves smelting. Other key words to determine manufacturing projects includes processing (shengchan) and spinning (fangzhi), etc.
In comparison, the business scope of project no. 3200201000100 states as "transportation of large equipment, loading, offloading and installation of large equipment, car repair, sale and maintenance of car components and equipment." This project is NOT considered as manufacturing because without production process, installation and maintenance alone are not considered to be of manufacturing status. Similarly, in project no. 1000201400308, oil drilling and remedial well treatment and service are not considered as manufacturing. 
INTERNATIONAL STANDARD INDUSTRIAL CLASSIFICATION REVISION 4 MANUFACTURING :
Division Products
